Observant Readers Take the Measure of Novel Approaches to Quantum Theory; Some Get Bohmed by Gell-Mann, Murray & Hahtle, James
Physics Today 
 
Observant Readers Take the Measure of Novel Approaches to Quantum Theory;
Some Get Bohmed
Murray Gell‐Mann, James Hahtle, Robert B. Griffiths, Anton Zeilinger, Robert T. Nachtrieb, James L.
Anderson, Allen C. Dotson, William G. Hoover, Henry M. Bradford, and Sheldon Goldstein 
 
Citation: Physics Today 52(2), 11 (1999); doi: 10.1063/1.882512 
View online: http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/1.882512 
View Table of Contents: http://scitation.aip.org/content/aip/magazine/physicstoday/52/2?ver=pdfcov 
Published by the AIP Publishing 
 
 
 This article is copyrighted as indicated in the article. Reuse of AIP content is subject to the terms at: http://scitation.aip.org/termsconditions. Downloaded to
IP:  131.215.225.131 On: Mon, 24 Aug 2015 23:19:45
LETTERS
Observant Readers Take the Measure of Novel
Approaches to Quantum Theory; Some Get Bohmed
In "Quantum Theory without Ob-servers—Part One" (PHYSICS TODAY,
March 1998, page 42), Sheldon Gold-
stein discusses our work on the deco-
herent histories (DH) approach to
quantum mechanics and the related
work of Robert Griffiths and Roland
Omnes. He describes correctly many
aspects of the research and makes a
number of favorable remarks, such as
"it seems likely that the program of
DH can be brought successfully to
completion." However, he seems to
have misunderstood one important
point, and as a result he mistakenly
attributes certain "inconsistencies" to
the program at its present stage.
We always consider a "realm"—a
set of mutually exclusive decoherent
histories with probabilities adding to
1—and we typically impose some fur-
ther conditions on a given realm. (A
"family," as discussed by Goldstein,
consists of a realm and all its coarse
grainings.) It is essential to restrict
statements relating the probabilities
of occurrence of histories to a given
family containing them. 'Here, we
have in mind statements such as the
following: If B happens at time U
and C at time t3i then A must have
happened at time tv) The restriction
is necessary despite the fact that the
numerical probability of a given his-
tory belonging to more than one fam-
ily is independent of the family. This
point has been stressed very strongly
by Griffiths and Omnes.1 Inconsisten-
cies can arise if statements relating
the probabilities of occurrence of histo-
ries are made while referring to differ-
ent families in the course of a given
argument. That is true even if the
histories involve only a single time.
Goldstein mentions our efforts to
understand what is so special about
the "usual" realm defined by hydro-
dynamic variables averaged over small
volumes and evaluated at short, al-
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beit discrete, intervals of time. How-
ever, he seems to think that we start
with the union of many different fam-
ilies (with the possibility of inconsis-
tencies in statements connecting the
probabilities of occurrence of various
histories) and are trying to find con-
ditions that will shrink this set to a
single realm and its associated fam-
ily thus eliminating inconsistencies.
That is not the case. Rather, we are
comparing the properties of different
realms or families, while restricting
our statements in each case to a sin-
gle family, thus encountering no in-
consistencies along the way.
It is worth mentioning that the fig-
ure caption on the last page of the ar-
ticle is misleading. The photograph
shows Richard Feynman and one of
us (Gell-Mann), and the caption de-
scribes Gell-Mann as "one of the most
sensible critics of orthodox quantum
theory" and Feynman as "one of its
most sensible defenders." In fact,
both physicists held very similar
views of quantum mechanics. Some
months before Feynman's death in
1988, Gell-Mann described to a class
at Caltech the status of our work on
decoherent histories at that time.
Feynman was in attendance, and at
the end of the class, he stood up, and
some of the students expected an ex-
citing argument. But his comment
was, "I agree with everything you
said."
There is no question that the "or-
thodox" Copenhagen interpretation
works in measurement situations and
accurately predicts the outcomes of
laboratory experiments. It is not
wrong. Rather, it is a special case
of the more general interpretation
in terms of decoherent histories of
the universe. The Copenhagen pic-
ture is too special to be fundamental,
and it is clearly inadequate for quan-
tum cosmology.
As Goldsteins title suggests, DH is
a formulation of quantum mechanics
in which observers do not play a fun-
damental role. We are working to
perfect that formulation. However,
we are not seeking, nor do we have, a
formulation that implements Albert
Einstein's idea of attributing "physical
reality" to all quantities for which
there are situations in which they
can be measured with certainty. In
DH, if two such quantities at the
same time do not commute, measure-
ments of them have to take place in
different alternative histories of the
universe.2 Our work is not com-
pletely finished, but the research
is not plagued by inconsistencies.
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Sheldon Goldstein's two-part articlecontains much valuable material.
Unfortunately, his discussion of consis-
tent histories is, in certain respects,
misleading; at the very least, it is out
of date. (Goldstein, following Murray
Gell-Mann and James Hartle, uses
the term "decoherent histories" for
what Roland Omnes and I call "con-
sistent histories.")
The logical structure of the consis-
tent histories approach has been
worked out in considerable detail by
Omnes, and paying serious attention
to his "Rule 4" l would have pre-
vented Goldstein from making the
erroneous assertion that the consis-
tent histories formalism is rendered
inconsistent by the results of An-
drew Gleason; Simon Kochen and
Ernst Specker; John Bell; and Lucien
Hardy. My own recent work2 has
led to a quite systematic treatment of
the whole subject, in which consistent
history "beables" (the physical refer-
ents of the mathematical terms) are
spelled out in considerable detail, and
the formalism is shown to be com-
plete as a fundamental theory, with-
out need of the additional principles
that Goldstein seems to think are nec-
essary. Although the "primitive ontol-
ogy" (to use Goldstein's term) of con-
sistent histories was not presented in
the earliest papers in as clear a form
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as is now possible—a quite common
occurrence when important new ideas
are introduced into physics—the fun-
damental ideas have not changed,
and more recent work has confirmed
the soundness of the basic strategy
adopted by Gell-Mann and Hartle,
Omnes and myself. (Readers inter-
ested in pursuing the subject further
may wish to consult reference 3,
which contains a response to various
criticisms and misunderstandings of
consistent histories, as well as simple
examples that may make some of the
ideas easier to follow.)
There is one aspect of consistent
histories that was perfectly clear in
the very first paper on the topic and
in all our subsequent work: A quan-
tum history consists of a sequence of
events at successive times, and these
events correspond to subspaces of the
quantum Hilbert space. In standard
quantum theory, a wavefunction is as-
sociated with a one-dimensional sub-
space of the Hilbert space, whereas
subspaces of higher dimension corre-
spond to collections of wavefunctions.
Thus, wavefunctions are the building
blocks out of which histories are con-
structed, and it is difficult to under-
stand why Goldstein asserts that, in
the consistent histories approach, "the
wavefunction is by no means the com-
plete description of a quantum sys-
tem; it is not even the most impor-
tant part of that description." It is
Bohmian mechanics, not consistent
histories, that needs ("hidden") vari-
ables in addition to the standard Hil-
bert space of wavefunctions for its
beables, and in this respect the ap-
proaches are actually quite different,
despite Goldstein s efforts to find
some parallels.
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gOLDSTEIN REPLIES TO GELL-MANNAND HARTLE AND TO GRIFFITHS:
The main complaint in these two let-
ters concerns my assertion that the
decoherent histories (DH) approach is
inconsistent (unless the basic decoher-
ence condition is augmented by addi-
tional fundamental set selection prin-
ciples). Before addressing this com-
plaint, though, I think it helpful to
look again at the example I presented
in my article (March 1998, page 45)
to illustrate the inconsistency.
For a certain quantum state ?//, say
at time t - 0, for a pair of spin-V2 par-
ticles, there are spin components A,
£, C and D (also at t = 0) for which
the DH approach yields the following
four statements concerning joint prob-
abilities P:
1. P(A = 1, B= l) = 0.09.
2. P(A = 1, C # l) = 0.
3. P(B = 1, D^ l) = 0.
4. P(C = 1, D= l) = 0.
Corresponding to these four state-
ments are four pairs of commuting
observables and four decoherent
families (the sort of families to which
DH assigns probabilities): the AB fam-
ily, the AC family, the BD family and
the CD family However, these fami-
lies cannot be combined into, say, an
ABCD family, and thus DH does not
supply us with probabilities for simul-
taneous values of A, S, C and D.
It is important to appreciate that,
for orthodox quantum theory (and, in
fact, even for Bohmian mechanics),
the four statements above, if used
properly, are not inconsistent, because
they then would refer merely to the
outcomes of four different experiments,
so that the probabilities would refer,
in effect, to four different ensembles.
However, the whole point of DH is
that such statements refer directly,
not to what would happen were cer-
tain experimental procedures to be per-
formed, but to the probabilities of occur-
rence of the histories themselves, re-
gardless of whether any such experi-
ments are performed. Thus, the state-
ments refer to a single ensemble of sys-
tems, for about 9C7c of which, according
to the first statement, both A and B
are 1; for none of which, according to
the second statement, can A be 1 with-
out C also being 1; and so on.
As such, the four statements above
are obviously inconsistent, since it fol-
lows from statements 1, 2 and 3 that,
contrary to statement 4, in at least 9cc
of the systems in the ensemble, C and
D are both 1. This is the inconsis-
tency to which I referred in my article.
Concerning this issue, Murray Gell-
Mann and James Hartle complain
that I have "misunderstood one impor-
tant point"—namely, that "it is essen-
tial to restrict statements relating the
probabilities of occurrence of histories
to a given family containing them"
because "inconsistencies can arise if
statements relating the probabilities
of occurrence of histories are made
while referring to different families in
the course of a given argument." I
am puzzled by their response. Each
of my four individual statements con-
cerns only probabilities for a single
family (with, of course, a different
one for each statement). And the fact
that "inconsistencies can arise . . . is
precisely the point of the example I
used in the article and am using here.
Robert Griffiths is more explicit
about the cause of my having made
"the erroneous assertion that the con-
sistent histories formalism is . . . in-
consistent"—namely, my not "paying
serious attention to [Omnes's] Rule 4."
Here is the rule, as given on page
163 of the reference Griffiths men-
tions: "Any description of the proper-
ties of an isolated physical system
must consist of propositions belonging
together to a common consistent logic.
Any reasoning to be drawn from the
consideration of these properties
should be the result of a valid implica-
tion or of a chain of implications in
this common logic.'1 What Omnes
calls a "consistent logic" amounts
more or less to a (decoherent) family
I have always had great difficulty
with this rule. I don't understand
what it actually means, in terms of
both detail and basic meaning. Does
the description provided by the four
statements in my example, which re-
quires reference to four families, vio-
late this rule because the four state-
ments are on adjacent lines? What if
they were on different pages, or were
made by different people? It can
hardly be expected that, when think-
ing about the same system, all people
at all times will—by some peculiar
harmony—formulate statements con-
cerning only the same common family.
Besides, why are my four state-
ments not a counterexample? They
are a description of precisely the sort
that Rule 4 informs us "must" not be.
This raises the question as to exactly
what is meant in the rule by "must,"
and, in its next sentence, by "should."
The real problem, I believe, is this:
If we "must" or "should" restrict our
descriptions and reasoning in the
manner described by Rule 4, it must
be because of the meanings of the
statements under consideration and
the way the language expressing them
is intended to function. For example,
if (as would be appropriate in ortho-
dox quantum theory) we were to use
the four statements above as an ellip-
tical way of talking about results of
possible experiments, then it is appar-
ent that we could get into trouble by
considering, at one time, several of
these statements, should we slide into
the mistake of thinking that the sev-
eral statements refer to a common
experiment.
However, if, for DH, descriptions
such as those provided by the state-
ments above are to be understood
with their usual meanings, then
Rule 4 is simply false, to the extent
that it has any meaning at all. And
12 FEBRUARY 1999 PHYSICS TODAY
 This article is copyrighted as indicated in the article. Reuse of AIP content is subject to the terms at: http://scitation.aip.org/termsconditions. Downloaded to
IP:  131.215.225.131 On: Mon, 24 Aug 2015 23:19:45
if the proponents of DH have some
other meaning in mind for such state-
ments, they should so inform us and
supply this meaning—something that,
as far as I am able to tell, they no-
where do.
It may be argued that Rule 4
should be regarded as merely a rule—
that is, as merely defining a certain
game. But then why must I play this
game when analyzing the implica-
tions of DH?
It is true that, to deduce or recog-
nize that the four statements above
are inconsistent, we must consider a
collection of statements involving
more than a single family. If we obey
Rule 4 in our analyses, we will en-
counter, as Gell-Mann and Hartle say,
"no inconsistencies along the way."
But the statements wall remain incon-
sistent even if we invoke and adhere
to rules that demand, in effect, that
we ignore the inconsistency.
In my article, I tried to present
the DH approach in what I deemed
the best possible manner. Whatever
its vices, this version, based on an
augmented decoherence condition,
has the virtue of consistency
Griffiths finds it "difficult to under-
stand" why I say that, for DH, the
wavefunction of a physical system
does not provide a complete descrip-
tion of the system. Let's focus, there-
fore, on the simplest possible example
to illustrate my point. Suppose that
at, say, t = 0, a single spin-1/? particle
is in a quantum state i1 with az = 1,
and suppose we consider the single-
time 'hence, decoherent) family corre-
sponding to the value of ax at this
. time. Then, for about half of the
members of a large ensemble of sys-
tems in this state, the value of crx is
1, and for these individual systems
the quantum state i>, which is a su-
perposition of the eigenstates of a,,
provides only partial information.
Griffiths claims that "wavefunc-
tions are the building blocks out of
which histories are constructed." In
the preceding example, the history
ax= 1 can be regarded (ignoring the
other degrees of freedom) as corre-
sponding to a wavefunction—namely,
the associated eigenstate. But this
wavefunction is by no means the
quantum state \p of the system, which
remains, for DH, an incomplete de-
scription of that system. Insisting
that histories be regarded as con-
structed out of wavefunctions makes
it more difficult to appreciate this
fact and obscures the dynamical char-
acter of the role played for DH by the
quantum state ip of a system.
Why, indeed, does Griffiths insist
upon so playing with words? Are
there any good reasons for doing so,
beyond supporting
the insinuation
that DH involves
only pure quan-
tum concepts, and
beyond sustaining
the illusion that,
unlike Bohmian
mechanics, it in-
volves no addi-
tional "hidden"
variables? —SG
Sheldon Gold-stein conjec-
tures that
"hardly anybody
truly believes . . .
anymore" in the
Copenhagen inter-
pretation of quan-
tum mechanics, es-
pecially in "the no-
tion that quantum
mechanics is
about observation
or results of meas-
urement" (March
1998, page 42).
From discussions
with a number of
colleagues, I know
that I am not the
only person to
whom the Copenhagen interpretation
remains one of the most significant in-
tellectual achievements of our cen-
tury. Therefore, Goldstein's conjec-
ture is certainly incorrect.
I suggest that the very austerity of
the Copenhagen interpretation, unsur-
passed by that of any other interpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics, speaks
very much in its favor. Indeed, its ba-
sic attitude toward the fundamental
role of observation represents a major
intellectual step forward over naive
classical realism. In classical physics,
observation is often regarded as a sec-
ondary concept, with the elements of
the real world being primary. Yet, it
is obvious that any statement about
nature has to be based on observa-
tion. What could then be more natu-
ral than a theory in which observa-
tion plays a more fundamental role
than in a classical worldview? What
could be more sensible than the the-
ory itself acknowledging that any
statement about the physical world ul-
timately is, at least implicitly, a state-
ment about observation?
Schrodinger's cat is paradoxical
only if one insists on pressing ortho-
dox quantum theory into service—as
many naively do—to imply that (in
Goldstein's words) "the cat is some-
how both dead and alive until an ob-
server checks to see" (March 1998,
page 43). Doing that reflects a seri-
V0 A&OVAT IT- /vto
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ous misunderstanding. All the quan-
tum state is meant to be is a repre-
sentation of the catalog of our knowl-
edge of the system. It is precisely
that catalog that is necessary to ar-
rive at the maximum possible set of
usually probabilistic predictions for
all possible future observations of the
system.
The revolutionary new feature of
quantum physics arises whenever
there is no way, not even in principle,
to tell which of various possibilities is
the case. Then, instead of just hav-
ing to acknowledge our ignorance, as
we would have to in classical physics,
quantum superposition comes in as a
qualitatively new property. If the con-
dition above should ever be realizable
for the dead and live states of a cat,
its quantum state has to be a superpo-
sition of these states. That clearly
does not mean the cat is both alive
and dead. It means only that no defi-
nite statement can be made concern-
ing the question of whether the poor
animal is alive or dead. Upon obser-
vation, we will find it in either state,
and thus the state assigned to the cat
collapses into either possibility.
It is not at all surprising that we
have to change the representation of
our knowledge if that knowledge
changes because of information ob-
tained by observation of the cat. The
collapse of the state vector can be
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seen only as a "measurement para-
dox" if one views this change of the
quantum state as a real physical proc-
ess. In the extreme, it is often even
claimed that something happens to
the cat because it is being observed.
There is no basis for any such claim.
In contrast, what can be more natu-
ral than to change the representation
of our knowledge—that is, the quan-
tum state—if we gain new knowledge
from a measurement performed on
the system? Any statement about
what is the case in the world can
then be obtained only with explicit ref-
erence to observation. Indeed, as in
the case of the measurement paradox,
the paradoxes constructed by oppo-
nents of the Copenhagen interpreta-
tion are always based on some realis-
tic pre-quantum notions about how
the world ought to be brought into
the discussion through the backdoor.
In fact, there is never a paradox if we
realize that quantum mechanics is
about information. Actually, such a
view also leads to a most natural un-
derstanding of new phenomena in
quantum computation and quantum
communication, such as quantum en-
tanglement, quantum nonlocality or
quantum teleportation. Then, no need
whatsoever arises to allude to such
notions as superluminal or instantane-
ous transmission of information.
It is very much to the credit of pro-
ponents of alternative approaches
such as Goldstein that, beginning
with Albert Einstein in the early 20th
century, they have realized—often in
a much deeper way than have the ad-
herents of the orthodox view—how
novel and counterintuitive some fea-
tures of quantum theory are. Yes, I
submit, real progress necessitates full
acceptance of these novel and counter-
intuitive features, including the funda-
mental role of observation and of re-
sults of measurements, rather than
trying to return to pre-quantum no-
tions and concepts.
ANTON ZEILINGER
(anton.zeilinger@physics.org)
University of Vienna
Vienna, Austria
GOLDSTEIN REPLIES TO ZEILINGER:Because of the strong disagree-
ment expressed by Anton Zeilinger in
the first two paragraphs of his letter,
I was surprised to find myself agree-
ing with much, if not most, of what
he said after that—namely, that
Schrodinger's cat paradox is indeed a
consequence of what Zeilinger terms
"a serious misunderstanding" of the
role of the quantum state; that when
the quantum state of the cat is in a
superposition of dead and alive, then
(in Zeilinger's words) "that clearly
does not mean the cat is both alive
and dead [but] only that no definite
statement can be made" on the ques-
tion, because we are, and must be, ig-
norant as to the fact; and that what
he calls a "natural understanding" of
the new quantum phenomena based
on entanglement neither requires nor
involves any "superluminal or instan-
taneous transmission of information."
These things are as true for Bohmian
mechanics—to take my favorite quan-
tum theory7 without observers—as
they are for orthodox quantum theory
as understood by Zeilinger.
Even the last sentence of his let-
ter, while a bit too dogmatic for my
taste, is one for which I have quali-
fied sympathy. However, his denigra-
tion of "pre-quantum notions,"—which
can mean anything from what he
calls "naive classical realism," to vari-
ables not definable (or defined) in
terms of Hilbert space structure, to
the possibility of any sort of observer-
independent reality—must be taken
with a grain of salt as being merely
an appeal to prevailing prejudices.
But does Zeilinger truly believe
that "quantum mechanics is about in-
formation"? Information is always in-
formation about something. There-
fore, shouldn't quantum mechanics be
regarded as being about that some-
thing? Quantum mechanics tells us
about atoms and chemical bonding
and high-temperature superconductiv-
ity. Of course, it also provides us
with information about these things.
But it does so precisely because it is
about the things themselves.
And does Zeilinger really wish to
deny that the change of the state vec-
tor that occurs during the measure-
ment process is "a real physical proc-
ess," even when it leads to the de-
struction of the possibility of interfer-
ence? Can quantum interference be
genuinely understood by invoking a
wavefunction that is nothing more than
"a representation of our knowledge'?
Moreover, it would not be at all
sensible for a theory to acknowledge
that "any statement about the world
has to make reference to observa-
tion," since Zeilinger's assertion is
plainly false. Statements about his-
tory are not statements about history
books, and statements about dino-
saurs are not statements about fossil-
ized dinosaur bones. And even state-
ments concerned with the present,
though they are typically based
rather directly on observations—if not
our own, then somebody else's—are
usually not about those observations.
Although it is presumably true that
the justification of any statement
about the world must be based, at
least in part, on experience or obser-
vation, there is nothing in Zeilinger's
assertion that "any statement about
nature has to be based on observa-
tion" to suggest, or even make plausi-
ble the idea, that observation has a
fundamental role to play in the formu-
lation, as opposed to the justification,
of physical theory.
What Zeilinger terms "the auster-
ity of the Copenhagen interpretation"
is very much like the austerity of sol-
ipsism, and it suffers from similar de-
fects. What results from this auster-
ity is not merely implausible, but also
deficient in the theoretical simplicity
afforded by an appeal to something
outside ourselves. —SG
Sheldon Goldstein invokes theEinstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR)
paradox to suggest that "the quantum
mechanical description is not the whole
story . . ." (March 1998, page 43).
Although every college physics stu-
dent has heard of the EPR paradox,
and most have read the original pa-
per in Physical Review} far fewer stu-
dents of quantum mechanics have
read the rebuttal to EPR that was
printed in Physical Review a year
later by Yale University professor
Henry Margenau.2 Margenau showed
that Einstein's objections to quantum
mechanics relied on the von Neu-
mann projection postulate, which says
that the measurement procedure "col-
lapses" the state of the system to the
eigenstate of the measured observable
with the recorded eigenvalue. As
Margenau made plain, the EPR para-
dox vanishes if the von Neumann pro-
jection postulate is abandoned.
Margenau and his student James
Park proved that the von Neumann
projection postulate is simultaneously
"absurd, false, and useless."3
1. Why the postulate is "absurd." The
concept of a quantum state is inher-
ently statistical. "Quantum state" re-
fers to the identical preparation of an
ensemble of identical systems. One
determines the state by recording the
eigenvalues (in principle an infinite
number of times) to get expectation
values of a "quorum" of observables.
Doing so in effect describes the prepa-
ration that yielded the state of the
systems in the ensemble (before the
measurement).
However, the projection postulate
says that a measurement on a single
system determines the state of the
system (after the measurement). But
this contradicts the statistical nature
of the quantum state. By itself, a sin-
gle measurement in quantum mechan-
ics cannot disclose a state unless one
has additional information not pro-
vided by that single measurement.
continued on page 89
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LETTERS (continued from page 15)
Park gave the example of a school
where one knows that all the stu-
dents are of the same gender; a
measurement on a single student
determines the gender of the whole
student population.
2. Why the postulate is "false." Real-
istic measurement procedures exist
that violate the projection postulate.4
For example, some measurements de-
stroy the state completely, such as a
photon hitting a phosphorescent
screen (measuring position), or a sil-
ver atom hitting a plate in a Stern—
Gerlach experiment (measuring spin
and position).
Other measurements could not pos-
sibly yield an eigenstate of the observ-
able since the eigenstate would contra-
dict certain aspects of the experimen-
tal setup. For example, if recording
an eigenvalue of the momentum op-
erator of a one-dimensional particle-in-
a-box left the particle in a momentum
eigenstate, elkx, the particle would no
longer be in the box, even if the walls
were infinitely high; the particle
would be distributed uniformly over
all space. As another example, if re-
cording an eigenvalue of the position
operator of a free particle left the par-
ticle in a position eigenstate, Stx-x^,
the particle would subsequently suffer
infinitely quick diffusion.
3. Why the postulate is "useless." No
quantum mechanical calculations re-
quire the invocation of the von Neu-
mann projection postulate. Axiomatic
quantum mechanics works just fine
with the standard axioms: (a) defini-
tion of the quantum state, repre-
sented by a density operator in Hil-
bert space (unit trace, Hermitian, non-
negative and so on); (b.) representation
of most observables by linear, Hermi-
tian operators in Hilbert space; and
(c) some form of equation of motion to
evolve the state in time.
Abandoning the von Neumann pro-
jection postulate resolves the EPR
paradox without having to concoct a
new quantum mechanics.
References
1. A. Einstein, B. Podolsky, N. Rosen,
Phys. Rev. 47, 777(1935).
2. H. Margenau, Phys. Rev. 49, 240 (1936).
3. J. L. Park, Philos. Sci. 35, 205 Q968).
4. H. Margenau, Philos. Sci. 25, 23 (1958).
ROBERT T. NACHTRIEB
(nachtneb@mit.edu)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts
GOLDSTEIN REPLIES TO NACHTRIEB:Whereas the projection postu-
late is, for Zeilinger, a triviality, for
Robert Nachtrieb it is an absurdity.
The truth probably lies somewhere be-
tween these extremes. However, re-
gardless of the status of the projec-
tion postulate, it is not true that, as
Nachtrieb claims, abandoning it "re-
solves the EPR paradox." This is be-
cause the EPR argument does not re-
quire the invocation of this postulate.
What it does require, in addition to
the assumption of locality, is merely
the quantum mechanical predictions
for the correlations between the out-
comes of certain experiments—predic-
tions that have repeatedly been con-
firmed. Recent formulations of the
EPR argument rarely, if ever, appeal
directly to the projection postulate.
And even in the original EPR paper,
a version of the argument that made
no such appeal was presented (along-
side one that did).
In my article, moreover, I referred
to the EPR paper merely to quote its
conclusion, that "the wave function
does not provide a complete descrip-
tion of the physical reality. . . ." To
support that conclusion, I neither re-
lied upon nor mentioned the EPR ar-
gument, but rather invoked entirely
different considerations.
I note that if it could be argued
convincingly that the projection postu-
late is "absurd," it would hardly be
necessary to argue that it is also
"false and useless." But it is none
of those things. Rather, it is merely
limited, an idealization useful for the
analysis of a restricted class of ex-
perimental situations. —SG
Sheldon Goldstein describes severalreformulations of quantum me-
chanics that attempt to do away with
the notion of an observer. He has, I
would argue, overlooked a much sim-
pler formulation than any of those he
discussed—namely, what I shall call
Bohmian quantum mechanics I
(BQMI), to distinguish it from the
Bohmian mechanics (BQMII) dis-
cussed in the second part of his
article (April, page 38).
The fundamental feature of BQMI,
described in David Bohm's great book
Quantum Theory,1 is the analysis of
the measurement process as a physi-
cal process. In this analysis, Bohm
recognized that a measuring appara-
tus is itself a physical system whose
dynamics is also described by the
laws of quantum mechanics. A meas-
urement is then considered to be an
interaction, again described by the
laws of quantum mechanics, between
the observed system and the appara-
tus. No additional postulates are
needed to determine the consequences
of the measurement process, such as
an assumed collapse of the wavefunc-
tion. In particular, much of the mys-
tery of the Copenhagen interpretation
is avoided by using this approach.
Bohm summarized his analysis by
concluding that "we are able to obtain
a complete objective description of the
process of the measurement, which
does not involve human observers in
any way at all" (page 607).
The notion that a measuring appa-
ratus is itself a physical system is not
unique to quantum mechanics. Many
of the difficulties one encounters in,
for example, both special and general
relativity—such as the so-called clock
paradox—can be avoided by dispens-
ing with the assumption that ideal
clocks measure proper time and by
introducing simple physical models
for clocks. I would argue, in fact,
that no physical theory is complete
unless it contains a complete descrip-
tion of the measurements it describes.2
One puzzle remains: Why did
Bohm in effect renounce BQMI by in-
troducing BQMII, given that BQMII
requires certain postulates—such as
ad hoc restrictions on initial condi-
tions—that are not needed in BQMI?
Furthermore, what problem was
solved by BQMII that could not be
dealt with by BQMI? To the best of
my knowledge, there is no way to dis-
tinguish between the two. Thus, a ju-
dicious application of Occam's razor
would surely favor BQMI over BQMII.
As a postscript, I urge anyone in-
terested in the measurement problem
(and even those who are not) to read
chapter 22 of Bohm's book.
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GOLDSTEIN REPLIES TO ANDERSON:I very much agree with James
Anderson's assertion that "no physical
theory is complete unless it contains
a complete description of the measure-
ments it describes," at least insofar
as potentially fundamental physical
theories are concerned. However, in
the final chapter of his great book
(page 625), Bohm concluded that
"without an appeal to a classical
level, quantum theory would have no
meaning. We conclude then that quan-
tum theory presupposes the classical
level and the general correctness of
classical concepts in describing this
level; it does not deduce classical con-
cepts as limiting cases of quantum
concepts' (emphasis in original).
Bohm's comment points to an im-
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portant distinction between BQMI
and BQMII, and it helps us under-
stand why, little more than a year af-
ter finishing his book, Bohm did in
fact "renounce BQMI by introducing
BQMII." Moreover, the abstract of
the paper in which Bohm presented
BQMII concludes as follows: "In any
case, the mere possibility of such an
interpretation proves that it is not
necessary for us to give up a precise,
rational, and objective description of
individual systems at a quantum
level of accuracy"1
BohnVs idea that, in Anderson's
words, "a measuring apparatus is it-
self a physical system whose dynam-
ics is also described by the laws of
quantum mechanics"—a notion that
goes back at least to John von Neu-
mann or Nevill Mott and certainly
did not originate with Bohm—is re-
quired for the very formulation of the
measurement problem, not its resolu-
tion. As far as the measurement
problem is concerned, this idea, with
which I agree, is part of the question,
not part of the answer.
Anderson implies that I wish uto
do away with the notion of an ob-
server." I do not.
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Sheldon Goldstein should realizethat standard quantum mechanics
in itself is technically observer-free:
As Goldstein notes, it predicts, for an
observable, "the distribution of the
value that would be found were the
appropriate measurement performed"
(March 1998, page 45). Thus, no
observers are actually required.
Naming the winner of the debate
between Niels Bohr and Albert Ein-
stein is still at issue, despite Gold-
stein's assertion favoring Einstein.
As Goldstein notes, Einstein believed
that quantum mechanics might be su-
perseded some day by a more com-
plete theory. However, it can be ar-
gued that the current evidence, includ-
ing that stemming from the work of
John Bell and Lucien Hardy, is most
simply explained by some form of
Bohr's conception of quantum states.
In that conception, dynamical vari-
ables that characterize a quantum
state are defined in connection with
specific experimental arrangements,
rather than as elements of reality as-
sociated solely with the object, as Ein-
stein would have wanted.
ALLEN C. DOTSON
(dotson@ta rtan. sapc. edu)
St. Andrews Presbyterian College
Launnburg, North Carolina
GOLDSTEIN REPLIES TO DOT-SON: Concerning Allen
Dotson's quibble about meas-
urement versus observation, I
could have called my article
"Quantum Theory without Ob-
servers or Measurements";
however, the title I chose is
awkward enough.
The work of Bell and
Hardy to which Dotson refers
is very interesting, particu-
larly with regard to nonlocal-
ity. But it is not very rele-
vant to deciding between, say,
Bohmian mechanics and ortho-
dox quantum theory, which ac-
count for the phenomena dis-
cussed by Bell and Hardy in a
surprisingly similar manner:
For both of those theories, the
"dynamical variables" (corresponding
to the outcomes of the experiments)
that Bell and Hardy discuss should
be regarded as "defined in connection
with specific experimental arrange-
ments," to use Dotson's phrase. —SG
At first glance, Bohmian mechan-ics and its "explanation" of the
two-slit experiment (April 1998, page
40) look marvelous. But isn't there
some difficulty in applying these
ideas to problems involving tunneling,
where the (quantum) kinetic energy
is negative?
WILLIAM G. HOOVER
(hoover@bonampak.llnl.gov)
University of California at
Davis (Livermore campus)
Li verm ore, California
Regarding part two of SheldonGoldsteins article (April 1998,
page 38), it should be noted that the
de Broghe-Bohm theory derives hid-
den particle trajectories and veloci-
ties that are compatible with Schro-
dinger s equation by identifying them
with the quantum mechanical prob-
ability current and flow velocity,
respectively.
This identification provides an in-
tuitively satisfying description of open
systems with more or less unidirec-
tional particle flow—two-slit interfer-
ence, for example—in which the
fringes are formed by objectively real
particles following deterministic trajec-
tories. However, it does not produce
a satisfactory description of hidden
trajectories in bound systems such as
atoms, in which some or all of the
components of the probability current
are zero (under such circumstances,
flow velocities reveal little about hypo-
thetical particle velocities). The
Bohm interpretation ascribes this con-
dition to electrons that are stationary
under the influence of counterbalanc-
ing gradients of the classical potential
and a quantum potential—at least in
some directions. Although this pic-
ture is self-consistent, a static model
of atomic electrons does not have the
intuitive appeal of a dynamic one,
and intuitive appeal is the point of
such models, since we cannot observe
the trajectories.
Eventually, a dynamic model of the
atom may be discovered that has hid-
den trajectories that are both comput-
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able and compatible with quantum
mechanics. Meanwhile, it may be bet-
ter to just say that we are at liberty
to postulate hidden deterministic par-
ticle trajectories that more or less fol-
low the probability current in open
systems (such as the two-slit interfer-
ence experiment), and that form closed
orbits in bound systems (such as at-
oms) consistent with some or all of the
components of the probability current
being zero—and to leave it at that.
HENRY M. BRADFORD
(hen ry.bra dford@ns. sympa tico. ca)
Wolfville, Nova Scotia, Canada
GOLDSTEIN REPLIES TO HOOVER ANDBRADFORD: My answer to Wil-
liam Hoover's question is, no. A parti-
cle moving according to the Bohmian
equations of motion can do things that
would be impossible classically. That
is because Bohmian mechanics is not
classical mechanics. Tunneling is a
prediction of—not a problem for—
Bohmian mechanics. It should be re-
garded as a virtue that such seemingly
paradoxical behavior is explained
with so little difficulty—as, in fact, it
is in Bohmian mechanics. Moreover,
the explanation does not involve any
appeal to imaginary velocities.
Henry Bradford faults the Bohm
interpretation because what it yields
is sometimes too simple. Atomic elec-
trons in certain stationary states are,
for Bohmian mechanics, at rest. Brad-
ford complains that this is nonintui-
tive. What this presumably means is
that it conflicts with our classical in-
tuitions, as well as with the Solar
System model of the (Bohr) atom that
we first learn. In other words, the
behavior is unfamiliar. But why
should a new theory predict only
familiar behavior?
By suitably complicating its defin-
ing dynamical equations, we could
transform Bohmian mechanics into
a theory in which atomic electrons
move in a manner more consistent
with our prejudices. But such consis-
tency would be of far less value to
me than the simplicity sacrificed to
obtain it.
I would not say that the point of
models like Bohmian mechanics is
what Bradford calls uintuitive ap-
peal." Nor is the problem with quan-
tum theory that it is nonintuitive.
Rather, the problem is that quantum
theory is unprofessionally subjective
and vague—if not downright incoher-
ent. And the root of that problem is
that it is not at all clear what quan-
tum theory is really about.
SHELDON GOLDSTEIN
(oldstein@math.rutgers.edu)
Rutgers University
New Brunswick, New Jersey
Journal's History and
Peer Review Process
Were Misrepresented
I am surprised to find myself mis-quoted—and to see certain other
errors—in Paul Moran's response to
two letters to the editor (December
1997, page 102) commenting on a
book review he had written for your
magazine. The following are five rea-
sons for my surprise.
First, although Moran attributes
to me two quotes about Raymond
Damadian and alleges that they come
from a casual conversation he and I
had back in the early 1970s, I do not
remember any such conversation
taking place.
Second, Moran quotes me as refer-
ring to Damadian as "Ray" but that is
simply not something I would do, be-
cause I know that nickname to be offen-
sive to Damadian. Thus, I question
that Moran's conversation was with me.
Third, I don't recall that, as Moran
alleges, Damadian published primar-
ily in Physiological Chemistry and
Physics (the journal's name in the
1970s; Moran got that wrong too).
Rather, I remember his publishing
in such journals as Science, the Bio-
physical Journal and the Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences,
as well as in what 111 call PC&P for
short. I believe you will find that
Damadian's first publication in
PC&P did not occur until 1975.
Fourth, contrary to Moran's asser-
tions, all manuscripts submitted to
PC&P were reviewed using orthodox
reviewing procedures.
Fifth, although Moran claims that
I told him in the early 1970s that
Damadian had already acquired the
rights to publish PC&P, Damadian's
acquisition did not occur until later in
that decade. Furthermore, although
the journal's name was changed at
that time {"and Medical NMR" was
added), no change was made in the
journal's editorial policy.
CARLTON F. HAZLEWOOD
<carltonh@swbcll.net)
Research Consultants International
The Woodlands, Texas
which to base major scientific pro-
gress of the future. This risk is espe-
cially serious for the science of cell
physiology, a field that is still in its
infancy and in which revolutionary
upheavals are ongoing.
Recognizing all this, the editors of
Physiological Chemistry and Physics
and Medical NMR (formerly Physi-
ological Chemistry and Physics) have
long held to an official policy based
on the belief that scientific issues
should be settled by investigations
and open debate, not by appeals to
anonymous judges. To achieve this
goal, the editors have established
over time a set procedure for evaluat-
ing submissions to the journal. It in-
cludes giving the author of a rejected
article the right to (1) rebut the rea-
sons given by the reviewers for rejec-
tion, (2) recommend to us a list of al-
ternative competent reviewers and (3)
in the case of ultimate rejection, have
us publish a brief priority note de-
scribing the article's key points and
its date of receipt by the journal.
The initial step in this procedure,
however, remains the obligatory use
of the orthodox peer review system.
The full procedure is described on the
front pages of each issue.
It was thus with astonishment and
dismay that we discovered that PHYS-
ICS TODAY has been made into a tool
to publicize a \dlifying statement to
the effect that our journal does not
use the orthodox review system. The
statement appears in Paul Moran's re-
ply to a couple of letters to the editor.
In making such a spurious statement,
Moran—who evidently knows so little
about our journal that he cannot even
get the name right, let alone our
evaluation procedure—defames not
only those of us who have run the
publication (I am the current editor-in-
chief) but also all the scientists who
have published their work in our
pages over the last three decades.
GILBERT N. LING
(gilberthng@dobar.org)
Physiological Chemistry
and Physics and Medical NMR
Melville, New York
The existence of the English word"peerless" points out that ap- "9
proval by peers as the sole condition C o t T C C t l O I l
for acceptance for publication of a sci-
entific manuscript is at best a risky
compromise. On the one hand, the
peer review system may provide an
editor with an easy way to turn down
truly undeserving writings. On the
other hand, it may result in the
throwing out of the very best on
December, page 54—The setting of
the fictional dinner at the University
of Cambridge presented in The Cam-
bridge Quintet: A Scientific Specula-
tion was misidentified in the review
of the book; its correct name is
Christ's College. |
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